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- handle: 10670/1.p3zpe5
- 0029-4624
- doi: 10.1111/nous.12515
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openAccess , https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ , BY
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knowledge philosophy of science cultureSujets proches
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Brian Porter et al., « A puzzle about knowledge ascriptions », Repository of Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of the University in Belgrade, ID : 10.1111/nous.12515
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Philosophers have argued that stakes affect knowledge: a given amount of evidence may suffice for knowledge if the stakes are low, but not if the stakes are high. By contrast, empirical work on the influence of stakes on ordinary knowledge ascriptions has been divided along methodological lines: “evidence-fixed” prompts rarely find stakes effects, while “evidence-seeking” prompts consistently find them. We present a cross-cultural study using both evidence-fixed and evidence-seeking prompts with a diverse sample of 17 populations in 11 countries, speaking 14 languages. Our study is the first to use an evidence-seeking prompt cross-culturally, and includes several previously untested populations (including indigenous populations). Across cultures, we do not find evidence of a stakes effect with our evidence-fixed prompt, but do with our evidence-seeking prompt. We argue that the divergent results reveal a tension within folk epistemology: people's beliefs about when it is appropriate to ascribe knowledge differ significantly from their actual practice in ascribing knowledge.