Returning to the Sensations Themselves

Résumé 0

This paper intends to clarify the exact scope of Sellarsian critique of the myth of the given concerning the relationships between science and perception, in light of a confrontation with phenomenology, and especially with Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Even though Sellars, in Empirisme et philosophie de l’esprit, denies that perception may have a foundational role in sciences and also seems to endorse, in some texts, that science must constitute itself apart from any reference to perceptual experience, there is in his philosophy the idea that language—and scientific language— refers to the perceived, which, according to him, is made of sensations. This idea occupies only a relatively marginal place in his thought, but it is essential for us to ensure the existence of a link between science and reality. From there, we can solve one of the recurring problems of the Sellarsian thought: the integration of the qualitative nature of experience into modern sciences.