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2021
- handle: 10670/1.qubsf6
- hal: hal-03194928
- doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105255
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Mots-clés
rational group agent uncertainty preference aggregation opinion pooling values aggregation static versus dynamic rationality expected-utility hypothesis Bayesianism group rationality versus Paretianism spurious unanimity ex-ante versus ex-post Pareto rational group agent D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and UncertaintyCiter ce document
Franz Dietrich, « Fully Bayesian Aggregation », Archive Ouverte d'INRAE, ID : 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105255
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Résumé
Can a group be an orthodox rational agent? This requires the group's aggregate preferences to follow expected utility (static rationality) and to evolve by Bayesian updating (dynamic rationality). Group rationality is possible, but the only preference aggregation rules which achieve it (and are minimally Paretian and continuous) are the linear-geometric rules, which combine individual values linearly and combine individual beliefs geometrically. Linear-geometric preference aggregation contrasts with classic linear-linear preference aggregation, which combines both values and beliefs linearly, but achieves only static rationality. Our characterisation of linear-geometric preference aggregation has two corollaries: a characterisation of linear aggregation of values (Harsanyi's Theorem) and a characterisation of geometric aggregation of beliefs.