Alignment between quality enforcement devices and governance structure in the agrofood vertical chains
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2005
- handle: 10670/1.r8v5pl
- hal: hal-02673005
- doi: 10.1007/s10997-005-1571-1
- PRODINRA: 49777
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s10997-005-1571-1
Mots-clés
BRAND NAME GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES REPUTATION CERTIFICATION QUALITY ENFORCEMENT VERTICAL CHAINS -bio]Sujets proches
Clinical reports Cases, clinical reports, statistics Social science Sciences, Social Human sciences Social studies Behavioral sciences Natural science Sciences Science of science Papers Organisation Meats Products, Manufactured Manufactured goods Products Manufactured products Pomology Fruits Economic theory Political economy Coats of arms Devices Arms, Coats of Heraldic devices Expenses Costs (Economics) Shoppers Customers (Consumers) Capital assets Fixed assets Structures Edifices HallsCiter ce document
Emmanuel Raynaud et al., « Alignment between quality enforcement devices and governance structure in the agrofood vertical chains », Archive Ouverte d'INRAE, ID : 10.1007/s10997-005-1571-1
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Résumé
Using a Transaction Cost Economics framework, this paper studies how supply chain governance are aligned with the type of quality enforcement mechanisms used in transactions with consumers. Specifically we compare governance of supply chains when private brand assures quality to chains where official certification assures products’ quality for customers. To test our proposition, we conducted a set of 42 case studies in 3 agro-food sectors (processed meat, cheese, fruits and vegetable) from 7 European countries. We found that supply chain governance is closer to hierarchy-like modes of organization in cases where reputational capital is the main quality assurance device, whereas market-like governance is more prevalent in cases with public certification.