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1 décembre 2019
- handle: 10670/1.ry613m
Ce document est lié à :
10.17151/difil.2019.20.35.3
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Mots-clés
The internalist requirement on reasons rationality practical sphere Fully rational agent Less than fully rational agent Smith WilliamsSujets proches
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Carlos Emilio García-Duque, « The concept of ‘rationality’ in the practical sphere », Discusiones Filosóficas, ID : 10670/1.ry613m
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In this paper, I shall attempt a characterization of Smith’s concept of ‘rationality’ in the practical sphere. My goal is to show that Smith’s requirements of rationality (as inspired by Williams) cannot provide a good and workable account of what it means to be a fully rational agent. To this end, I shall examine Williams’ internalist requirement on reason and discuss the main shortcomings of such account of rationality. I shall try to show, also, that Smith’s and Williams’ views on rationality are too restrictive and thus cannot be applied to ordinary agents who deliberate in real life.