Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks
Fiche du document
2018
- handle: 10670/1.t3phhm
- hal: hal-02057380
- doi: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Non-Renewable Resource Management Delegated Management Optimal Contract Asymmetric InformationSujets proches
Administration Kinetics Dynamical systems Information, Asymmetric Asymmetric information Asymmetry, InformationCiter ce document
David Martimort et al., « Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks », Archive Ouverte d'INRAE, ID : 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
We characterize the optimal contract for resource extraction in a context where the concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. The dynamics of extraction is characterized by a virtual Hotelling rule in which costs of extraction are replaced with virtual costs of extraction. We analyze how structural breaks in the price of resource impact the dynamics of extraction.