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- handle: 10670/1.y3w3ud
- hal: hal-03049041
- doi: 10.1257/mic.20180225
- WOS: 000590196300009
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/mic.20180225
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D62 - Externalities L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization/L.L8 - Industry Studies: Services/L.L8.L86 - Information and Internet Services • Computer SoftwareSujets proches
Standard of value Industrial economics Market structureCiter ce document
Gary Biglaiser et al., « The Value of Incumbency When Platforms Face Heterogeneous Customers », Archive Ouverte d'INRAE, ID : 10.1257/mic.20180225
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Résumé
We study competition for the market in a dynamic model with network externalities, focusing on the efficiency of market outcomes. We propose a representation of the strategic advantages of incumbency and embed it in a dynamic framework with heterogeneous consumers. Then, we completely identify the conditions under which inefficient equilibria with several platforms emerge at equilibrium; explore the reasons why these inefficient equilibria arise; and compute the value of incumbency and analyze why static models generally exaggerate it.