Reforms meet fairness concerns in school and college admissions

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Date

11 septembre 2020

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arXiv

Collection

arXiv

Organisation

Cornell University


Mots-clés

Economics - Theoretical Economics


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Somouaoga Bonkoungou et al., « Reforms meet fairness concerns in school and college admissions », arXiv, ID : 10670/1.z0hf51


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Recently, many matching systems around the world have been reformed. These reforms responded to objections that the matching mechanisms in use were unfair and manipulable. Surprisingly, the mechanisms remained unfair even after the reforms: the new mechanisms may induce an outcome with a blocking student who desires and deserves a school which she did not receive. However, as we show in this paper, the reforms introduced matching mechanisms which are more fair compared to the counterfactuals. First, most of the reforms introduced mechanisms that are more fair by stability: whenever the old mechanism does not have a blocking student, the new mechanism does not have a blocking student either. Second, some reforms introduced mechanisms that are more fair by counting: the old mechanism always has at least as many blocking students as the new mechanism. These findings give a novel rationale to the reforms and complement the recent literature showing that the same reforms have introduced less manipulable matching mechanisms. We further show that the fairness and manipulability of the mechanisms are strongly logically related.

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