Fiche du document
2019
- handle: 10670/1.zo7fz1
- halshs: halshs-02291876
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Indirect evolutionary approach Evolutionary stability Groups Altruism Conflicts C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D64 - Altruism • Philanthropy D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D74 - Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances • RevolutionsSujets proches
Amusements Children--Recreation Games for children Pastimes Primitive games Recreations Games, Primitive Children's gamesCiter ce document
Guillaume Cheikbossian, « Evolutionarily stable in-group altruismin intergroup conflict », Archive Ouverte d'INRAE, ID : 10670/1.zo7fz1
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Résumé
We provide an evolutionary explanation for the well-established evidence of the existence of in-group favoritism in intergroup conflict. Using a model of group contest, we show that the larger the number of groups competing against one another or the larger the degree of complementarity between individual efforts, the more likely group members are altruistic towards their teammates under preference evolution.