Fiche du document
19 juillet 2022
- 2207.09253
Mots-clés
Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
PollsCiter ce document
Xu Lang et al., « Symmetric reduced form voting », arXiv - économie
Partage / Export
Résumé
We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and qualified anti-majority. We also provide analogous results by requiring implementation by a symmetric monotone (strategy-proof) voting rule and by a symmetric unanimous voting rule. We apply our results to show that an ex-ante Rawlsian rule is a convex combination of a pair of qualified majority rules.