Undominated monopoly regulation

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Date

18 août 2024

Type de document
Périmètre
Identifiant
  • 2408.09473
Collection

arXiv

Organisation

Cornell University




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Debasis Mishra et al., « Undominated monopoly regulation », arXiv - économie


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We study undominated mechanisms with transfers for regulating a monopolist who privately observes the marginal cost of production. We show that in any undominated mechanism, there is a quantity floor, which depends only on the primitives, and the regulator's operation decision is stochastic only if the monopolist produces at the quantity floor. We provide a near-complete characterization of the set of undominated mechanisms and use it to (a) provide a foundation for deterministic mechanisms, (b) show that the efficient mechanism is dominated, and (c) derive a max-min optimal regulatory mechanism.

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