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Stéphane Gonzalez
et al. (Mar 13, 2023)

Textual materials

The axiomatic foundations of Bentham and Rawls solutions are discussed within the broader domain of cardinal preferences. It is unveiled that both solution concepts share all four of the following axioms: Nonemptiness, Anonymity, Unanimity, and Continuity. In order to fully characterize the Bentham...

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al.

Articles

The article explores the implications of natural resource scarcity in terms of global cooperation and trade. We investigate whether there exist stable international long-term agreements that take into account the disparities between countries in terms of geological endowments and productive capacity...

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al. (2019)

Preprint

The article explores the implications of natural resource scarcity in terms of global cooperation and trade. We investigate whether there exist stable international long-term agreements that take into account the disparities between countries in terms of geological endowments and productive capacity...

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al. (2018)

Articles

We introduce axiomatically a new solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility inspired by the core. While core solution concepts have investigated the sustainability of cooperation among players, our solution concept, called contraction core, focuses on the deterrence of cooperat...

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al. (2018)

Preprint

We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core of games in effectiveness form. We point out that the core, whenever it applies to appropriate classes of these games, coincides with a wide variety of prominent stability concepts in social choice and game theory, such as the Condorcet winner, th...

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al. (2018)

Preprint

We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core of games in effectiveness form. We point out that the core, whenever it applies to appropriate classes of these games, coincides with a wide variety of prominent stability concepts in social choice and game theory, such as the Condorcet winner, th...

Conferences and symposiums

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al. (Nov 10, 2017)

Conferences and symposiums

International audience

Conferences and symposiums

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al. (Sep 1, 2017)

Conferences and symposiums

International audience

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al. (2017)

Articles

New Insights on the Coase Theorem and the Emptiness of the Core This paper is a contribution to the literature which uses the theory of cooperative game in order to test the validity of the Coase Theorem in a 3-player game. We examine situations, not studied by Coase [1960], which give rise to new c...

Articles

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al. (2016)

Articles

The paper proposes a new concept of solution for TU games, calledmulticoalitional solution, which makes sense in the context of production games,that is, where $v(S)$ is the production or income per unit of time. By contrastto classical solutions where elements of the solution are payoff vectors,mul...

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al. (2016)

Preprint

We introduce axiomatically a new solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility inspired by the core. While core solution concepts have investigated the sustainability of cooperation among players, our solution concept, called contraction core, focuses on the deterrence of cooperat...

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al. (2015)

Articles

In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of general solutions, that is, to distribute the total worth of the...

Articles

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al. (2015)

Articles

We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that the grand coalition is necessarily the final state of cooperation. Partitions of the grand coalition, or balanced collections together with a system of balancing weights interpreted as a time allocation vector are consider...

Others

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al.

Others

We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that the grand coalition is necessarily the final state of cooperation. Partitions of the grand coalition, or balanced collections together with a system of balancing weights interpreted as a time allocation vector are consider...

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al.

Others

The paper proposes a new concept of solution for TU games, called multicoalitional solution, which makes sense in the context of production games, that is, where v(S) is the production or income per unit of time. By contrast to classical solutions where elements of the solution are payoff vectors, m...

Stéphane Gonzalez
et al.

Others

In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of general solutions, that is, to distribute the total worth of the...

David Lowing
(Jun 27, 2022)

Thesis

The role of a gas distribution network is to connect consumers to a gas source. This network is managed by an operator, whose task incurs various costs. Some of these costs may not be attributable to a particular consumer.Assuming that the operator wishes to recover these costs by charging for its s...

Cristina Levinski
(Apr 5, 2016)

Blog posts

12 avril 2016, de 18h à 20h Campus Tréfilerie, Université Jean Monnet Bâtiment R, salle R.0.2, 10 rue Richard, 42023 Saint-Etienne Avec Henri Sterdyniak, co-animateur des Économistes Atterrés et conseiller scientifique à l'OFCE. Conférence animée par Stéphane Gonzalez, économiste à l'IAE et au GATE...