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31 octobre 2007
- 10261/1768
Ce document est lié à :
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
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638.05
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Mots-clés
Experiments Mechanisms UncertaintySujets proches
Agency (Philosophy) Agents Person (Philosophy)Citer ce document
David Pérez-Castrillo et al., « Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism », Digital.CSIC (SHS)
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Résumé
Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory: it provided the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to the theoretical bidding behavior.