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5 novembre 2007
- 10261/1796
Ce document est lié à :
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
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613.04
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Mots-clés
Aspiration function Envy-free social choice function Fairness, implementation Indivisible goodsSujets proches
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Róbert Ferenc Veszteg, « Fairness under Uncertainty with Indivisibilities », Digital.CSIC (SHS)
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Résumé
I analyze an economy with uncertainty in which a set of indivisible objects and a certain amount of money is to be distributed among agents. The set of intertemporally fair social choice functions based on envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency is characterized. I give a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness and propose a mechanism that implements the set of intertemporally fair allocations in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Implementation at the ex ante stage is considered, too. I also generalize the existence result obtained with envy-freeness using a broader fairness concept, introducing the aspiration function.