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6 novembre 2007
- 10261/1917
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UFAE and IAE Working Papers
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495.01
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Mots-clés
Settlement Tax evasion Optimal auditingSujets proches
Tax-dodging Tax fraud Fiscal evasion Taxation--Evasion Tax avoidance Tax delinquency Taxation, Evasion of Evasion, FiscalCiter ce document
David Pérez-Castrillo et al., « Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution », Digital.CSIC (SHS)
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Résumé
It is often argued that even if optimal ex-post, settlement dilutes deterrence ex-ante. We analyze the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex-ante, to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex-ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers' true tax liability. The more informative the signal, the larger the additional expected evenue raised by the tax authority when using settlement as a policy tool.