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13 avril 2018
- 1804.04789
Mots-clés
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence Computer Science - Multiagent Systems Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
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Sam Ganzfried et al., « Successful Nash Equilibrium Agent for a 3-Player Imperfect-Information Game », arXiv - économie
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Résumé
Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, but no guarantees in non-zero-sum games or in games with more than two players. We describe an agent that is able to defeat a variety of realistic opponents using an exact Nash equilibrium strategy in a 3-player imperfect-information game. This shows that, despite a lack of theoretical guarantees, agents based on Nash equilibrium strategies can be successful in multiplayer games after all.