Fiche du document
3 août 2018
- 1808.01351
Mots-clés
Economics - Theoretical Economics 91B15Sujets proches
BiasCiter ce document
Christopher P. Chambers et al., « A characterization of "Phelpsian" statistical discrimination », arXiv - économie
Partage / Export
Résumé
We establish that statistical discrimination is possible if and only if it is impossible to uniquely identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realized empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependent, remuneration for workers. Finally, we connect the statistical discrimination literature to Bayesian persuasion, establishing that if discrimination is absent, then the optimal signaling problem results in a linear payoff function (as well as a kind of converse).