The Structure of Equilibria in Trading Networks with Frictions

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Date

23 août 2018

Type de document
Périmètre
Identifiant
  • 1808.07924
Collection

arXiv

Organisation

Cornell University




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Jan Christoph Schlegel, « The Structure of Equilibria in Trading Networks with Frictions », arXiv - économie


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Résumé 0

Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility and in the presence of frictions. While our results are developed in a trading network model, they also imply analogous (and new) results for exchange economies with combinatorial demand and for two-sided matching markets with transfers.

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