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31 août 2018
- 1809.00051
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Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
Economic theory Political economy Bank discount Discount rateCiter ce document
Pathikrit Basu et al., « Repeated Coordination with Private Learning », arXiv - économie
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Résumé
We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true state from private signals, as well as the actions of others. They commonly learn the true state (Cripps et al., 2008), but do not coordinate in every equilibrium. We show that there exist stable equilibria in which players can overcome unfavorable signal realizations and eventually coordinate on the correct action, for any discount factor. For high discount factors, we show that in addition players can also achieve efficient payoffs.