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12 septembre 2018
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- 1809.04436
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Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
Endeavor Effort Balancing (Physics) Balance (Physics) Balance Economic theory Political economyCiter ce document
Doron Klunover et al., « A note on contests with a constrained choice set of effort », arXiv - économie
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We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that all equilibria are near the unconstrained equilibrium. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the case when players have different prize evaluations.