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26 décembre 2018
- 1812.10326
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Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
Contract law Contracts--Law and legislation Contractual limitations Limitations, Contractual AgreementsCiter ce document
Jan Christoph Schlegel, « Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms », arXiv - économie
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Résumé
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a choice profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism. Our result can be interpreted as a (weak) embedding result for choice functions under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand holds.