Algorithm as Experiment: Machine Learning, Market Design, and Policy Eligibility Rules

Fiche du document

Date

26 avril 2021

Type de document
Périmètre
Identifiant
  • 2104.12909
Collection

arXiv

Organisation

Cornell University



Sujets proches En

Learning, Machine

Citer ce document

Yusuke Narita et al., « Algorithm as Experiment: Machine Learning, Market Design, and Policy Eligibility Rules », arXiv - économie


Partage / Export

Résumé 0

Algorithms make a growing portion of policy and business decisions. We develop a treatment-effect estimator using algorithmic decisions as instruments for a class of stochastic and deterministic algorithms. Our estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal for well-defined causal effects. A special case of our setup is multidimensional regression discontinuity designs with complex boundaries. We apply our estimator to evaluate the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, which allocated many billions of dollars worth of relief funding to hospitals via an algorithmic rule. The funding is shown to have little effect on COVID-19-related hospital activities. Naive estimates exhibit selection bias.

document thumbnail

Par les mêmes auteurs

Sur les mêmes sujets

Sur les mêmes disciplines

Exporter en