Fiche du document
6 mai 2021
- 2105.02828
Mots-clés
Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
Salesmen and salesmanship SalesmanshipCiter ce document
Yeon-Koo Che et al., « Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods », arXiv - économie
Partage / Export
Résumé
We study robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes revenue robustly against a worst-case distribution of a buyer's valuations within a set of distributions, called an ``ambiguity'' set. We identify the exact forms of robustly optimal selling mechanisms and the worst-case distributions when the ambiguity set satisfies a variety of moment conditions on the values of subsets of goods. We also identify general properties of the ambiguity set that lead to the robust optimality of partial bundling which includes separate sales and pure bundling as special cases.