Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules and Hybrid Domains

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Date

22 mai 2021

Type de document
Périmètre
Identifiant
  • 2105.10677
Collection

arXiv

Organisation

Cornell University




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Shurojit Chatterji et al., « Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules and Hybrid Domains », arXiv - économie


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We study a class of preference domains that satisfies the familiar properties of minimal richness, diversity and no-restoration. We show that a specific preference restriction, hybridness, has been embedded in these domains so that the preferences are single-peaked at the "extremes" and unrestricted in the "middle". We also study the structure of strategy-proof and unanimous Random Social Choice Functions on these domains. We show them to be special cases of probabilistic fixed ballot rules (introduced by Ehlers, Peters, and Storcken (2002)).

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