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18 juillet 2021
- 2107.08423
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Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
Inspection by sampling Populations, Human Human populations Population growth Human population Recreations Balancing (Physics) Balance (Physics) Balance Economic theory Political economy Kinetics Dynamical systems Demography DemographicsCiter ce document
Srinivas Arigapudi et al., « Sampling dynamics and stable mixing in hawk-dove games », arXiv - économie
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Résumé
The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium in which players in one population play hawk and players in the other population play dove, and an inefficient symmetric mixed equilibrium, in which hawks are frequently matched against each other. The existing literature shows that populations will converge to playing one of the pure equilibria from almost any initial state. By contrast, we show that plausible sampling dynamics, in which agents occasionally revise their actions by observing either opponents' behavior or payoffs in a few past interactions, can induce the opposite result: global convergence to one of the inefficient mixed stationary states.