The emergence of cooperation from shared goals in the Systemic Sustainability Game of common pool resources
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1 octobre 2021
- 2110.00474
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Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
Kinetics Dynamical systemsCiter ce document
Chengyi Tu et al., « The emergence of cooperation from shared goals in the Systemic Sustainability Game of common pool resources », arXiv - économie
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Résumé
The sustainable use of common-pool resources (CPRs) is a major environmental governance challenge because of their possible over-exploitation. Research in this field has overlooked the feedback between user decisions and resource dynamics. Here we develop an online game to perform a set of experiments in which users of the same CPR decide on their individual harvesting rates, which in turn depend on the resource dynamics. We show that, if users share common goals, a high level of self-organized cooperation emerges, leading to long-term resource sustainability. Otherwise, selfish/individualistic behaviors lead to resource depletion ("Tragedy of the Commons"). To explain these results, we develop an analytical model of coupled resource-decision dynamics based on optimal control theory and show how this framework reproduces the empirical results.