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12 mars 2022
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- 2203.06353
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Choice, Social Public choice Collective choiceCiter ce document
Federico Echenique et al., « Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice », arXiv - économie
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We study efficiency in general collective choice problems where agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed. We explore the structure of preference profiles where ex-ante and ex-post efficiency coincide, offer a unifying perspective on the known results, and give several new characterizations. The results have implications for well-studied mechanisms including random serial dictatorship and a number of specific environments, including the dichotomous, single-peaked, and social choice domains.