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11 mai 2022
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- 2205.05599
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Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
Businesses Firms Companies Enterprises Business organizations Organizations, BusinessCiter ce document
Chao Huang, « Two-sided matching with firms' complementary preferences », arXiv - économie
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This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms' acceptable sets. We also provide a class of preference profiles that satisfy this condition. Our results indicate that stable matching is compatible with a wide range of firms' complementary preferences.