Fiche du document
29 juillet 2022
- 2207.14666
Mots-clés
Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
Economic theory Political economy Aversion, LossCiter ce document
Vincent Meisner et al., « Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms », arXiv - économie
Partage / Export
Résumé
Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria. We find that non-truthful preference submissions can be strictly optimal if and only if they are top-rank monotone. In equilibrium, inefficiency or justified envy may arise in seemingly stable or efficient mechanisms. Specifically, students who are more loss averse or less confident than their peers obtain suboptimal allocations.