The Power of Non-Superpowers

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Date

21 septembre 2022

Type de document
Périmètre
Identifiant
  • 2209.10206
Collection

arXiv

Organisation

Cornell University




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Tomoo Kikuchi et al., « The Power of Non-Superpowers », arXiv - économie


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We propose a game-theoretic model to investigate how non-superpowers with heterogenous preferences and endowments shape the superpower competition for a sphere of influence. Two superpowers play a Stackelberg game by providing club goods. Their utility depends on non-superpowers who form coalitions to join a club in the presence of externality. The coalition formation, which depends on the characteristics of non-superpowers, influences the behavior of superpowers and thus the size of their clubs. Our data-based simulations of the subgame perfect equilbirum capture how the US-China competition depends on other countries.

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