Rationalization of indecisive choice behavior by majoritarian ballots

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Date

30 octobre 2022

Type de document
Périmètre
Identifiant
  • 2210.16885
Collection

arXiv

Organisation

Cornell University




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José Carlos R. Alcantud et al., « Rationalization of indecisive choice behavior by majoritarian ballots », arXiv - économie


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We describe a model that explains possibly indecisive choice behavior, that is, quasi-choices (choice correspondences that may be empty on some menus). The justification is here provided by a proportion of ballots, which are quasi-choices rationalizable by an arbitrary binary relation. We call a quasi-choice $s$-majoritarian if all options selected from a menu are endorsed by a share of ballots larger than $s$. We prove that all forms of majoritarianism are equivalent to a well-known behavioral property, namely Chernoff axiom. Then we focus on two paradigms of majoritarianism, whereby either a simple majority of ballots justifies a quasi-choice, or the endorsement by a single ballot suffices - a liberal justification. These benchmark explanations typically require a different minimum number of ballots. We determine the asymptotic minimum size of a liberal justification.

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