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6 janvier 2023
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- 2301.02697
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Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
Papers Pattern Model Electoral politics Franchise Polls Economic theory Political economyCiter ce document
Brian Duricy, « Preferences on Ranked-Choice Ballots », arXiv - économie
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This paper formalizes the lattice structure of the ballot voters cast in a ranked-choice election and the preferences that this structure induces. These preferences are shown to be counter to previous assumptions about the preferences of voters, which indicate that ranked-choice elections require different considerations for voters and candidates alike. While this model assumes that voters vote sincerely, the model of ranked-choice elections this paper presents allows for considerations of strategic voting in future work.