Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future

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Auteur
Date

16 mars 2023

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Type de document
Périmètre
Identifiant
  • 2303.09675
Source

arXiv - économie

Collection

arXiv

Organisation

Cornell University

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Economics - Theoretical Economics

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Hours (Time) Economic theory Political economy

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Ian Ball, « Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future », arXiv - économie

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I study the optimal provision of information in a long-term relationship between a sender and a receiver. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and commits to send signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses public actions that affect the welfare of both players. I solve for the sender's optimal policy in closed form: the sender reports the value of the state with a delay that shrinks over time and eventually vanishes. Even when the receiver knows the current state, the sender retains leverage by threatening to conceal the future evolution of the state.

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