Characterizing the Feasible Payoff Set of OLG Repeated Games

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Date

22 mars 2023

Type de document
Périmètre
Identifiant
  • 2303.12988
Collection

arXiv

Organisation

Cornell University




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Daehyun Kim et al., « Characterizing the Feasible Payoff Set of OLG Repeated Games », arXiv - économie


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We study the set of feasible payoffs of OLG repeated games with general stage games. Our first main result completely characterizes the set of feasible payoffs given any fixed discount factor of players and the length of interaction. We can use this result to obtain the feasible payoff set in closed form. Second, we provide a novel comparative statics of the feasible payoff set with respect to the discount factor and the length of interaction. Perhaps interestingly, the feasible payoff set becomes smaller as players' discount factor becomes larger. In addition, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for this monotonicity to be strict.

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