Cooperation and Cognition in Social Networks

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Date

2 mai 2023

Type de document
Périmètre
Identifiant
  • 2305.01209
Collection

arXiv

Organisation

Cornell University




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Edoardo Gallo et al., « Cooperation and Cognition in Social Networks », arXiv - économie


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Social networks can sustain cooperation by amplifying the consequences of a single defection through a cascade of relationship losses. Building on Jackson et al. (2012), we introduce a novel robustness notion to characterize low cognitive complexity (LCC) networks - a subset of equilibrium networks that imposes a minimal cognitive burden to calculate and comprehend the consequences of defection. We test our theory in a laboratory experiment and find that cooperation is higher in equilibrium than in non-equilibrium networks. Within equilibrium networks, LCC networks exhibit higher levels of cooperation than non-LCC networks. Learning is essential for the emergence of equilibrium play.

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