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14 juillet 2023
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Transportation industry Transport Transportation companies Transportation--Economic aspects Transportation, Primitive Public transportationCiter ce document
Itai Arieli et al., « Persuasion as Transportation », arXiv - économie
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Résumé
We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with one informed sender and several uninformed receivers. The sender can affect receivers' beliefs via private signals, and the sender's objective depends on the combination of induced beliefs. We reduce the persuasion problem to the Monge-Kantorovich problem of optimal transportation. Using insights from optimal transportation theory, we identify several classes of multi-receiver problems that admit explicit solutions, get general structural results, derive a dual representation for the value, and generalize the celebrated concavification formula for the value to multi-receiver problems.