Transaction Ordering Auctions

Fiche du document

Auteur
Date

4 décembre 2023

Discipline
Type de document
Périmètre
Identifiant
  • 2312.02055
Source

arXiv - économie

Collection

arXiv

Organisation

Cornell University

Mots-clés Und

Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Economics - Theoretical Economics

Sujets proches En Fr

Informatics Hours (Time) Balancing (Physics) Balance (Physics) Balance Economic theory Political economy computing informatisation

Citer ce document

Jan Christoph Schlegel, « Transaction Ordering Auctions », arXiv - économie

Partage / Export

Résumé 0

We study equilibrium investment into bidding and latency reduction for different sequencing policies. For a batch auction design, we observe that bidders shade bids according to the likelihood that competing bidders land in the current batch. Moreover, in equilibrium, in the ex-ante investment stage before the auction, bidders invest into latency until they make zero profit in expectation. We compare the batch auction design to continuous time bidding policies (time boost) and observe that (depending on the choice of parameters) they obtain similar revenue and welfare guarantees.

document thumbnail

Par les mêmes auteurs

Sur les mêmes sujets

Sur les mêmes disciplines

Exporter en