Entanglement: Balancing Punishment and Compensation, Repeated Dilemma Game-Theoretic Analysis of Maximum Compensation Problem for Bypass and Least Cost Paths in Fact-Checking, Case of Fake News with Weak Wallace's Law
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18 février 2024
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- 2403.02342
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Physics - Physics and Society Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
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Yasuko Kawahata, « Entanglement: Balancing Punishment and Compensation, Repeated Dilemma Game-Theoretic Analysis of Maximum Compensation Problem for Bypass and Least Cost Paths in Fact-Checking, Case of Fake News with Weak Wallace's Law », arXiv - économie
