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28 mars 2024
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- 2403.19945
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Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
Dynasties (Royal houses) Royalty Royal families Rulers Sovereigns Royalty Royalty Royalty Rulers Monarchs Kings and rulers, Primitive Sovereigns RoyaltyCiter ce document
Ian Ball et al., « Optimal Auction Design with Flexible Royalty Payments », arXiv - économie
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We study the design of an auction for a license. Each agent has a signal about his future profit from winning the license. If the license is allocated, the winner can be charged a flexible royalty based on the profits he reports. The principal can audit the winner, at a cost, and charge limited penalties. We solve for the auction that maximizes revenue, net auditing costs. In this auction, the winner pays linear royalties up to a cap, beyond which there is no auditing. A more optimistic bidder pays more upfront in exchange for a lower royalty cap.