Coevolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching in repeated interactions.
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2016
- doi: 10.1098/rspb.2016.0488
- issn: 0962-8452
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1098/rspb.2016.0488
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/pmid/27306050
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/eissn/1471-2954
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/urn/urn:nbn:ch:serval-BIB_E1800DF4751A0
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M. Wubs et al., « Coevolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching in repeated interactions. », Serveur académique Lausannois, ID : 10.1098/rspb.2016.0488
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Résumé
Cooperation based on mutual investments can occur between unrelated individuals when they are engaged in repeated interactions. Individuals then need to use a conditional strategy to deter their interaction partners from defecting. Responding to defection such that the future payoff of a defector is reduced relative to cooperating with it is called a partner control mechanism. Three main partner control mechanisms are (i) to switch from cooperation to defection when being defected ('positive reciprocity'), (ii) to actively reduce the payoff of a defecting partner ('punishment'), or (iii) to stop interacting and switch partner ('partner switching'). However, such mechanisms to stabilize cooperation are often studied in isolation from each other. In order to better understand the conditions under which each partner control mechanism tends to be favoured by selection, we here analyse by way of individual-based simulations the coevolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching. We show that random interactions in an unstructured population and a high number of rounds increase the likelihood that selection favours partner switching. In contrast, interactions localized in small groups (without genetic structure) increase the likelihood that selection favours punishment and/or positive reciprocity. This study thus highlights the importance of comparing different control mechanisms for cooperation under different conditions.