Fiche du document
12 juin 2017
- doi: 10.1111/ecca.12246
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/ecca.12246
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/pissn/0013-0427
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/urn/urn:nbn:ch:serval-BIB_DB7C8DBF45C81
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess , Copying allowed only for non-profit organizations , https://serval.unil.ch/disclaimer
Sujets proches
Fortunes Household income Personal income Family incomeCiter ce document
J. T. Lind et al., « Knowledge is Power: A Theory of Information, Income and Welfare Spending », Serveur académique Lausannois, ID : 10.1111/ecca.12246
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but richer voters are on average best informed. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, income is more important in affecting voting behaviour for more informed voters than for less informed voters. Further, when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory.