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Marco Tomassini et al., « Evolution of Coordination in Social Networks: A Numerical Study », Serveur académique Lausannois, ID : 10.1142/S012918311001583X
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Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social behavior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local network effects may promote selection of efficient equilibria in both pure and general coordination games and may explain social polarization. These results are put into perspective with respect to known theoretical results. The main insight we obtain is that clustering, and especially community structure in social networks has a positive role in promoting socially efficient outcomes.