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2002
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Pierre Pestieau et al., « Partons-nous à la retraite trop tôt ? », Revue économique, ID : 10.3406/reco.2002.410447
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Résumé
Are we retiring early? It is often argued that implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly workers is responsible for the widely observed trend towards early revirement. In a first best world, it is certainly possible to eliminate this taxation and have a social security scheme that is redistributive and efficient at the same time. This paper shows that in a second best world, the optimal policy implies an inducement to retire early. We considera model where the social objective is utilitarian and where individuals differ both in unobservable productivity and health status.