La supériorité militaire soviétique : l’alibi et l’instrument de l’hégémonie américaine

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1994

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Copyright PERSEE 2003-2023. Works reproduced on the PERSEE website are protected by the general rules of the Code of Intellectual Property. For strictly private, scientific or teaching purposes excluding all commercial use, reproduction and communication to the public of this document is permitted on condition that its origin and copyright are clearly mentionned.



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Pierre Lépinasse, « La supériorité militaire soviétique : l’alibi et l’instrument de l’hégémonie américaine », Revue Française d'Études Américaines, ID : 10.3406/rfea.1994.1550


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The end of the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet system caused many, on being told about the sorry state of the USSR's whole economy and industry, to wonder why and how the Red army had been built into such an ominous threat. After reviewing a number of American books and journals from 1944 to 1993, one may come to surmise that Moscow's purposely inflated power was used as an alibi to federally subsidize private corporations, with the taxpayers' money, so as to make them highly competitive in world markets.

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