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2004
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Hostilities Conflict, Armed (War) Wars Armed conflict (War) FightingCiter ce document
Bruno Drweski, « L'engrenage de la désillusion : l'alliance franco-polonaise au moment de l'heure de vérité », Revue des Études Slaves, ID : 10.3406/slave.2004.6890
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The Big Disillusion : the French-Polish Alliance in September 1939 The Polish defeat of September 1939 had different causes. The question of the German responsibility is well known, such as the Polish incapacity to win the war. The role played by the USSR after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact has also been largely exposed. But the reasons for the basically inactive diplomatic and then military comportment of both the United Kingdom and France during the August-September 1939 crisis have been very rarely analysed. This situation explains to a certain extent why the war became possible and why USSR acted as it did. We are now in a position to observe the events of 1939 without being submitted to the pressures coming from the political situation as it was after 1939 and 1945.