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27 septembre 2010
- doi: 10.3886/ICPSR27807.v1
- 27807
Mots-clés
economic indicators government expenditures legislative impact political expenditures political influence politicsSujets proches
Electoral politics Political behavior Politics Mass political behavior Practical politics Political thought Government Political theory Civil government Commonwealth, The Science, Political Administration Politics Negotiations Bargaining Haggling Negotiating Higgling Dickering Bargaining Labor negotiations Politics and suffrage Government and politics Politics Political historyCiter ce document
Eric D. Raile et al., « Legislative Support, Pork, and Coalitions in Brazil, January 1997-December 2005 », Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, ID : 10.3886/ICPSR27807.v1
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This study examined how presidents in multiparty regimes win legislative support by considering dynamism, particular bargaining contexts, and combining separate lines of research on distributive politics and coalition formation. The results of three-stage least squares regression support the assertion that pork (benefits bestowed for legislative support) and coalition goods function as imperfect substitutes, with coalition goods establishing a baseline for exchange, and pork covering the ongoing costs of operation. The empirical tests also show that pork expenditures depend on a president's bargaining leverage and the distribution of legislative seats.