2 juillet 2020
https://www.openedition.org/12554 , info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Fabien Cayla, « La nature des contenus émotionnels », Éditions de l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales, ID : 10.4000/books.editionsehess.10141
One opposes often the « cognitive » and « non cognitive » views of emotions, which one ties to the choice of a first person or a third person perspective upon intentional states. If, however, one gives to the words « cognitive » and « cognition » the traditional meaning they have in philosophical English, then it is easy to see that such an opposition is not justified. There is indeed no principled difficulty about taking the point of view of the first person on intentionality, and claiming that emotional attitudes involve non emotional, hence « cognitive », components, since the cognitive is opposed to the conative and the affective.