2 juillet 2020
https://www.openedition.org/12554 , info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Christine Tappolet, « Les émotions et les concepts axiologiques », Éditions de l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales, ID : 10.4000/books.editionsehess.10189
Emotions are often seen as inevitably comprising states about axiological propositions. If that is true, one must have axiological concepts to be able to feel emotions. Such a conception allows to account for many features of emotions, such as their intentionality, and the fact that they can be appropriate or not. However, many objections can be raised against such a conception. These objections show that the set forth contents are not conceptual. Thus, if the contents of perceptual experiences are not conceptual, emotions could be compared with perceptual experiences.