Gödel and the Paradox in Max Phil X

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15 octobre 2021

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Presses universitaires de Provence

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OpenEdition Books

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https://www.openedition.org/12554 , info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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philosophy Philosophy PHI000000 HP

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Knowledge--Philosophy Mental philosophy Concept formation

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Gabriella Crocco et al., « Gödel and the Paradox in Max Phil X », Presses universitaires de Provence, ID : 10.4000/books.pup.53600

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There is a main thesis in the Russell paper which postulates that concepts —conceived as properties and relations in intension— exist independently of our definitions and constructions (Gödel 1990 p. 128). This thesis has three remarkable consequences that are developed throughout the entire article: a1. concepts exist separately from their arguments. In other words, concepts don’t presuppose their domain of application, neither for their definition nor for their being (Gödel 1990 pp. 125-6);...

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