Gödel’s Distinction Between Objective and Subjective Concepts

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15 octobre 2021

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https://www.openedition.org/12554 , info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess



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Concept formation

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Amélie Mertens, « Gödel’s Distinction Between Objective and Subjective Concepts », Presses universitaires de Provence, ID : 10.4000/books.pup.53610


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Introduction Throughout his published works, Kurt Gödel demonstrates his view of conceptual realism where he argues that concepts are independent of our constructions and definitions. In his paper, “Russell’s Mathematical Logic” (Gödel 1990: 128), he affirms: “classes and concepts may, however, also be conceived as real objects, […] existing independently of our definitions and constructions”, and continues: “it seems to me that the assumption of such objects is quite legitimate as the assump...

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